CVE-2026-120307: beam-cloud Beta9 worker, обхождане на път

9.9

CVSS 3.1

Няма данни

Вероятност да бъде експлоатирана в следващите 30 дни (EPSS)

Няма потвърждение

Атакува се

Няма данни

Време до експлоатация

Атакува се по мрежата, без особени условия, с обикновен потребителски вход и без действие от потребителя.

CVE радар: още уязвимости от този вид

Експлоатация: няма данни за експлоатация
Атаката не може да се автоматизира

Описание

Оригинално описание

The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.

CVE-2026-120307: beam-cloud Beta9 worker, обхождане на път

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